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URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c0099Immigrants to the United States from Mexico become assimilated into
American society much less rapidly than do other groups. A few facts from
the 2000 U.S. Census make the slowness of Mexican integration apparent.
1. About 80 percent of non-Mexican immigrants are ﬂuent in English.
Among Mexicans, the number is 49 percent.
Figure 3.1 shows the diﬀerences across groups in graphic detail. The
groups depicted in the graph are the largest subgroups in the 2000 Census.
Mexicans clearly have the lowest average levels of ﬂuency.
English ﬂuency depends on the amount of time that an individual has
been in the country. Figure 3.2makes clear that Mexicans start below other
groups in levels of English ﬂuency when they arrive in the United States
and never catch up. The curves never converge. Other Hispanics start
above and stay above Mexicans. Non-Hispanics are signiﬁcantly more ﬂu-
ent in English than Hispanics at all times after arrival in the United States.
2. Non-Mexican (working) immigrants have average wage income of on
average $21,000 per year. Mexican immigrants have average wage income
of on average $12,000 per year.
3. The typical non-Mexican immigrant has a high school diploma. The
typical Mexican immigrant has less than an eighth grade education. Part
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ful suggestions. I also thank Ben Ho for comments and assistance.This is not the whole story. Even among immigrants who came to the
United States before they were ﬁve years old and whose entire schooling
was in the United States, those Mexican born have average education lev-
els of 11.7 years, whereas those from other countries have average levels of
education of 14.1 years.1
4. Even when compared to other Hispanics, Mexican immigrants fare
badly, with 62 percent of non-Mexican Hispanics being ﬂuent in English as
compared to only 49 percent for Mexican immigrants. Mexican average in-
comes are about 75 percent that of other Hispanic immigrants, and Mexi-
can immigrants have about 2.5 fewer years of schooling.
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1. The sample is restricted to those who are now at least twenty-three years old so that
schooling is completed for most in the sample.
Fig. 3.1 English ﬂuency among immigrant groups
Fig. 3.2 FluencyThe numbers leave little doubt that Mexican immigrants do not move
into mainstream American society as rapidly as do other immigrants.
Three other facts are worth noting. First, Mexican immigrants live in
communities2 where about 15 percent of the residents are also born in
Mexico. Non-Mexican immigrants live in counties where fewer than 3 per-
cent of the residents are from their speciﬁc native land. As I have argued
elsewhere, the incentive to become assimilated depends in large part on the
proportion of individuals in one’s community who do not speak his native
language or share his culture. Correcting for the diﬀerence in living pat-
terns eliminates just about half of the ﬂuency diﬀerence between Mexicans
and other immigrants.
Second, Mexican immigrants account for a much higher proportion of
the immigrant population than any other single group. Mexicans are 29
percent of immigrants in the 2000 Census. Other large groups are from the
Philippines, Germany, China, and India and have shares roughly an order
of magnitude smaller. Mexico is about 20 percent larger in population than
the Philippines, but has about one-tenth the population of either India or
China. This suggests that it is easier to obtain entry to the United States
from Mexico than it is from most other countries.
Third, Mexicans come to the United States disproportionately on the
basis of family connections. Other groups, most notable, Indians, come in
at high levels based on job performance.
3.1 Model
The model used here comes from Lazear (1999). Only a sketch of the the-
ory is provided here.
Culture facilitates trade. This is most clear in the case of language. If two
agents speak the same language, they can negotiate a contract without the
use of a translator. While language may be the most important manifesta-
tion of a shared culture, a common culture allows the traders to have com-
mon expectations and customs, which enhances trust.
The focus is on incentives to become assimilated, and the model pre-
sented here deﬁnes trade to include nonmarket interaction as well.3 In the
simplest structure, assume that an individual randomly encounters one
and only one other individual in each period. Let the expected value to one
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2. Strictly speaking, the census 5 percent sample uses Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA),
which is a geographic unit that is akin to county, but not the same thing in most cases.
3. The empirical literature on the economic returns to assimilation began with Chiswick
(1978). More to the point of this analysis is the work by McManus, Gould, and Welch (1983),
which shows that English speaking Hispanic Americans do better in the labor market than
non-English speaking ones. Also, Chiswick (1991) ﬁnds that both speaking and reading ﬂu-
ency aﬀect earnings, with reading ﬂuency playing the more important role. Chiswick (1993)
studies the acquisition of Hebrew language skills in Israel. As in the United States, Chiswick
ﬁnds that the ability to speak the majority language increases earnings in Israel.party of meeting another individual with whom one can trade be normal-
ized to be 1. For simplicity, let there be only two cultures in a country, la-
beled Aand B. Deﬁne p aas the proportion of individuals who belong to cul-
ture Ain equilibrium and pbas the proportion of individuals who belong to
culture B in equilibrium. The majority culture is A, which means that p a  
pb. It is possible that p a pb 1 as one individual can belong to two cultures
as, for example, in the case of bilingual persons. In order for trade to occur,
an individual must encounter another individual with his own culture. If
the per-trader value of a trade is 1, then the expected gains from trade that
accrues to As and Bs are
(1) Ra   p a
and
Rb   pb.
Since p a   pb, Ra   Rb, individuals from the majority are richer than those
from the minority.
Either type of individual can acquire the culture of the other group. The
interest here is in minorities who acquire or choose not to acquire the lan-
guage or culture of the majority. By becoming assimilated, they have the
ability to trade with the majority group as well as members of their own mi-
nority. In the case of language, this can be thought of as becoming ﬂuent
in the majority language, while retaining the ability to speak the native
tongue.
It is costly to acquire the new culture or to learn the new language. De-
ﬁne ti as an individual speciﬁc cost parameter that measures (inversely) the
eﬃciency with which individual j acquires the new culture with tj ~ g(tj)
having distribution G(tj).
A monocultural B receives income pb. If the minority member becomes
bicultural, every encounter results in a trade, but tj is spent learning the
ways of the majority. Thus, the B acquires the A culture if and only if
(1   tj)   pb
or if and only if
(2) tj   1   pb.
It follows that
(3) Proportion of Bs who learn A   prob(tj   1   pb)
  G(1   pb).
Proportion G(1 – pb) of the Bs are suﬃciently eﬃcient at acquiring the new
culture to make it worthwhile.
Because G(1 – pb) is decreasing in pb, the proportion of a minority group
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portion of the population comprising the minority group. Also, p a   pb
guarantees that the proportion of majority members who learn the minor-
ity language is smaller than the proportion of minority members who learn
the majority language.
As pb decreases, the minority group becomes smaller relative to the ma-
jority, which means that random contact with another is less likely to result
in a trade. When pb is very small, minority members must be assimilated in
order to survive in the society.
The key insight from this model is that high proportions of similar-
cultured individuals in a community retard the rate of assimilation. This
eﬀect goes part of the way to explaining the slow assimilation of Mexicans
into American society. Because Mexicans live in communities with other
Mexicans to a larger degree (by far) than other ethnic groups, Mexicans in-
centives to assimilate are reduced relative to other immigrants. But this is
not the entire story. As will be shown in the following, were Mexicans in
communities that resembled those of other immigrants, about half of the




The data come from the 2000 U.S. Census, 5 percent sample. The 5 per-
cent sample provides far more observations than are needed, but only the
5 percent sample contains the detailed information on residential location
that is necessary to perform the analysis. As a result, the 5 percent Census
Public Use sample was the starting point, but from it, only one in ﬁve indi-
viduals were selected (randomly) to be included in the sample used for
analysis.
The variables, their deﬁnitions, and means are given in table 3.1.
The basic argument is that slow assimilation is a characteristic of those
who live in concentrated communities where a large proportion of individ-
uals are born in their native land. The fundamental result is shown in table
3.2. Linear probability models are presented for ease of interpretation.
Logit result, also provided, are virtually identical.
The basic result is clear in column (1). Those who live in concentrated ar-
eas are far less likely to be ﬂuent in English. The coeﬃcient on cntyprop (the
proportion of individuals who are born in the respondents native country)
is around –1. This implies that going from a PUMA where everyone was
born in the respondent’s native land to one in which no others were born in
the respondent’s native land would change ﬂuency rates from zero to 1.
It is useful to do the same analysis for Mexicans and non-Mexican im-
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are smaller for Mexicans than for non-Mexicans, perhaps reﬂecting non-
linearities in part that will be discussed in the following.
For now, it is most instructive to use these results in order to ﬁnd out how
much of the diﬀerence between Mexican and non-Mexican immigrant ﬂu-
ency can be explained by living patterns. The mean level of cntyprop is .151
for Mexicans and .027 for non-Mexicans. The mean level of yrus is 13.8 for
Mexicans and 18.8 for non-Mexicans. Using the coeﬃcients from column
(1), were Mexicans to have the same mean levels of cntyprop and yrus as
other the non-Mexican immigrants, the predicted ﬂuency rate would be 65
percent instead of the actual 49 percent, which closes about half of the gap
between Mexican and non-Mexican immigrants. This is sizeable and im-
portant but does not eliminate the ﬂuency gap between Mexican and non-
Mexican immigrants.
As noted, there are large diﬀerences between the coeﬃcients in columns
(3) and (4). In particular, the cntyprop coeﬃcient is much smaller for Mex-
icans than for non-Mexicans. Thus, if the experiment is that of raising
other immigrants’ level of cntyprop to that of Mexicans, column (4) is rel-
evant. The interpretation is that if non-Mexicans had levels of cntyprop as
high (and yrus as low) as Mexicans, they would be about 15 percent less ﬂu-
ent than they are now, reducing their ﬂuency rate to about 65 percent or
again accounting for half of the diﬀerence. But if the experiment is that of
taking Mexicans in their current communities and giving them the mea-
sured attributes of the non-Mexican immigrants, then column (3) is rele-
vant and ﬂuency would rise by only 7 percent or about one-fourth of the
gap.
3.2.2 Return Migration
The preceding model is an investment model, and the return to investing
in language and cultural assimilation depends on the length of time during
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Table 3.1 Immigrant sample: Includes all in sample not born in the United States
Standard 
Variable Deﬁnition Mean deviation
ﬂuent Dummy: 1 if respondent claims ﬂuency in English .71 .45
cntyprop Proportion of other residents in PUMA who are 
born in respondent’s native country .06 .10
yrus Years in United States 17.3 14.9
cnty2 (cntyprop)2 .014 .037
cntyyr (cntyprop)(yrus) .98 2.22
edyrs Highest grade of schooling completed in years 10.8 5.1
Mexican Dummy: 1 if born in Mexico .29 .45
Latin Dummy: 1 if hispanic origin .44 .5
cntyed (cntyprop)(edyrs) .55 1.0which an individual expects to remain in the country. There are two rea-
sons why this might be shorter for Mexicans than for non-Mexican immi-
grants. First, Mexico shares a border with the United States, and travel be-
tween the two is likely to be lower cost and more frequent. Second, and
related, there may be a high proportion of illegal immigrants from Mexico
who show up in the census data. If illegals have a shorter expected duration
of stay in the United States or ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to avail themselves of
the resources necessary to become assimilated and learn English, then
Mexican immigrants may be adversely aﬀected.
Evidence supports the basic ingredient behind this argument, namely
that duration of time over which the language will be used aﬀects the prob-
ability of assimilation as measured by English ﬂuency. Including an age
variable in the regression reported in table 3.2, column (1) yields a coeﬃ-
cient of –.00678 with a standard error of .00005. If one thinks of each ad-
ditional year of age as shorting the horizon over which English will be used
by about one year, then the preceding logic that relates to return migration
ﬁnds support. The eﬀect is large. A forty-year-old immigrant is about 14
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Table 3.2 Fluency results
Regression
Logit No 
Regression Logit Mexicans Mexicans
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
cntyprop –1.062 –5.108 –.988 –.241 –4.212 –10.778 –4.874 –4.315
(.007) (.040) (.012) (.014) (.066) (.114) (.140) (.146)
yrus .00650 .04585 .00497 .00868 .04998 .08112 .07914 .06220
(.00005) (.00038) (.00005) (.00014) (.00046) (.00087) (.00089) (.00094)
cntyyr –.055 –.087 –.076 –.047
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
cnty2 19.95 10.06 8.11
(.29) (.32) (.34)








constant .662 .552 .729 .408 .492 .478 .859 –.518
(.001) (.007) (.001) (.003) (.008) (.009) (.010) (.014)
r-square 0.1083 .0675 .0426
Log 
likelihood –168,137 –167.989 –164,919 –158,468 –147,397
N 308,345 308,345 218,330 90,015 308,345 308,345 308,345 308,345percent less likely to be ﬂuent in English than a twenty-year-old immi-
grant.4
3.2.3 Two Mechanisms
There are two interpretations of the results of table 3.2, both of which are
consistent with the theory. One is that English is learned more rapidly by
immigrants who are in integrated communities, viewing locational choice
as exogenous.
The second interpretation is one of endogenous location choice. Immi-
grants who do not speak English may be more likely to locate in areas
where there are many others who speak their language. This second view
reﬂects the same mechanism described in this paper. Individuals who are
not ﬂuent in English move to high cntyprop areas precisely because they
cannot interact with others unless they do. If it were unnecessary to be with
individuals who share language to interact, the locational pattern of immi-
grants would be uncorrelated with English ﬂuency. Immigrants might still
cluster just because diﬀerent areas settle at diﬀerent times, and immigrant
waves are time dependent, but there would be no reason to expect that
those who did not live in highly immigrant concentrated neighborhoods
would be more likely to attain English ﬂuency.
The two interpretations are more a question of timing than of substance.
Immigrants who know English had to make a decision to learn it at some
point in the past. That decision was likely inﬂuenced by their desire to
trade with other English speakers. Those who learn English after coming
to the United States perform the same calculation but do so at a later stage.
Thus, the sorting story diﬀers from the learning story primarily on the tim-
ing at which English was learned, not on the motives for learning English.5
The coeﬃcients in column (5) of table 3.2 allow these eﬀects to be disen-
tangled. If learning while in United States is the primary mechanism, then
one would expect the eﬀect of clustering to operate through the interaction
with the yrus variable. Each year in the United States should be less valu-
able to English ﬂuency for individuals who are in high cntyprop areas. In
fact, that is what is found. Both mechanisms seem operative. Even when
yrus   0, the eﬀect of cntyprop on ﬂuency is large and strong. Those who
move to concentrated areas start out with a ﬂuency deﬁcit relative to other
immigrants. It is also true, however, that those who live in concentrated ar-
eas are less likely to become ﬂuent with each additional year in the United
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4. Additionally, the sample contains young children who may not be ﬂuent in any language.
As a result, the regression run in column (1) of table 3.2 was repeated excluding children un-
der ﬁve, eight, and ten years of age. The coeﬃcients on both the cntyprop and yrus variables
were virtually unaﬀected (although statistically diﬀerent) by the diﬀerent exclusion restric-
tions.
5. It is likely that those who come to the United States are not a random sample of the
language-learning skill distribution. Those who ﬁnd it easiest to learn English will receive
higher wages when they come to the United States and are therefore more likely to emigrate
from their native land.States than those who live in less-concentrated areas. Comparing the typi-
cal Mexican residence where cntyprop equals .151 to the typical non-
Mexican immigrant’s residence where cntyprop equals .027 implies a re-
duction in the eﬀect of years in the United States by (.151 – .027) (–.055)/
.05   –.136 or by 13.6 percent of the eﬀect of years in the United States.
Both mechanisms are large and important.
Two caveats are in order. Because the data are from a single cross section
and not a panel, years in the United States is not simply a duration variable
but also reﬂects diﬀerent cohorts. Those who have been in the United
States longer are from an earlier cohort. To the extent that cohorts vary
over time in their learning skills as argued by Borjas (1985), part of the pos-
itive eﬀect of time in the United States reﬂects cohort eﬀects. Not only
would this show up as a shifter in the constant term (yrus), but it also could
be related to the interaction (yrus)(cntyprop). But the eﬀect seems to go in
the wrong direction. Because the sign is negative, being in a highly con-
centrated area hurts learning more for early cohorts than for later cohorts.
One might expect that better learners would be more immune to being in a
highly concentrated area than slower learners. It is possible, however, that
an argument could be made in the other direction.
Second, it is possible that those who are high-cost learners also go to
highly concentrated areas. If true, then it is not only concentration per se
that reduces the incentive to learn but also the fact that concentrated areas
have poorer language learners.
Incidentally, there is evidence that country of origin, not merely lan-
guage, is relevant, at least in terms of residential pattern. Natives of Mex-
ico do not live in the same neighborhoods as natives of Cuba or Puerto
Rico. The correlation between the proportion of a community that is Mex-
ican and the proportion that is non-Mexican Hispanic is actually negative
(–.27). If language were the only relevant factor, one would expect the cor-
relation to be positive.6
Column (6) of table 3.2 allows nonlinear terms to enter the logit. Not
surprisingly, eﬀects are highly nonlinear. Initial years in the United States
matter more than subsequent years for ﬂuency, and going from .01 to .02
cntyprop has a larger negative eﬀect on ﬂuency than going from .30 to .31
cntyprop. The nonlinearity is not suﬃcient, however, to account for the
very large diﬀerences between the linear coeﬃcients on cntyprop in col-
umns (2) and (3). Running linear probability regressions for Mexicans and
non-Mexicans separately, while including quadratic terms, still yields very
diﬀerent coeﬃcients between the two groups. Eﬀects of cntyprop are much
more damped for the Mexican group.
The logit reported in column (7) of table 3.2 shows that Hispanics are
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6. See Kalnins and Chung (2004) for a study that shows that large hotels that are run by In-
dians do better when there are other Indians in the community, the interpretation being that
individuals learn from others who share culture. Language is not the issue because virtually
all are English speakers.less ﬂuent in English than other groups and that Mexicans are less ﬂuent
than Hispanics. The cntyprop variable is not the whole story as already dis-
cussed previously. Both Latin and Mexican variables are important even
when cntyprop is included in the logit. The diﬀerence between Mexicans
and other Hispanics in ﬂuency is more pronounced than the coeﬃcient on
the Mexican dummy in column (7) would suggest. The average level of ﬂu-
ency among non-Mexican Hispanics is 62 percent, whereas the average
level of ﬂuency among Mexican Hispanics is 49 percent. Recall that the
logit holds cntyprop constant, but Mexicans live in more concentrated
communities than other Hispanics. Non-Mexican Hispanics live in com-
munities where the average value of cntyprop is .06. Mexicans live in
communities where the average value of cntyprop is .15. But note that the
non-Mexican Hispanic value of .06 is well above the .02 value for non-
Hispanics. The average level of ﬂuency among non-Hispanic immigrants is
84 percent.
3.2.4 Other Potential Measures
The key variable, cntyprop, is a measure of the proportion of individu-
als in the census unit, PUMA, who were born in the respondent’s native
country. But the PUMA can be quite a large area and may not be the vari-
able that best measures living patterns or typical encounters among indi-
viduals of various ethnic categories. For one thing, there may be a small
proportion of individuals in a PUMA, but enough of them may be con-
centrated in a suﬃcient small area to provide the kind of social network
that mitigates the adverse consequences lack of English skills.
There is no way using the Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) Cen-
sus data to get more reﬁned measures than PUMA. It might be possible to
do more with the exact communities and cities using other qualitative data.
The eﬀect of using an imperfect proxy of the variable that is desired has the
eﬀect of reducing the estimated coeﬃcient. This is a standard errors-in-
variables problem that biases the coeﬃcient toward zero. (There is no ob-
vious reason why the measurement error would be correlated with the ob-
served variable, making it something other than white noise.) As such, the
estimated eﬀect probably understates the true eﬀect of concentration to the
extent that cntyprop measures badly the interaction or residence group in
question.
3.2.5 The Role of Income and Education
Not surprisingly, education is closely associated with English ﬂuency.
Those who acquire more education become ﬂuent in English, and those
who plan to attain high levels of education tend to be more ﬂuent in En-
glish. Column (8) of table 3.2 is identical to column (7), except that column
(8) holds constant years of education attained. The shape of the relation of
ﬂuency to cntyprop changes slightly but remains almost the same. But it is
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of education increases ﬂuency by 2.7 percent, so going from an eighth
grade education to high school graduation increases expected ﬂuency by
11 percent.
Education is not independent of cntyprop. Those who live in high cn-
typrop areas get fewer years of education. Table 3.3 reports the results. In
the regression in column (1), only individuals who grew up in the United
States and who have likely completed their education are included. Specif-
ically, only individuals who were older than twenty-three and who were
younger than six when they came to the United States are included.
Just as in the logit on ﬂuency, the relation of education to cntyprop is
negative and convex. There are two additional points worth noting. First,
even holding cntyprop constant, Mexicans and other Hispanics obtain
fewer years of education than other immigrants. Second, cntyprop is a
measure of current residence, not necessarily the residence where the indi-
vidual was raised. So again, the exact mechanism is in question. Is living in
a highly concentrated area detrimental to educational attainment, or do
those who fail to get educated choose to live in concentrated areas?
The eﬀect of concentration on ﬂuency is more pronounced for the highly
educated. Although having high levels of education implies more ﬂuency,
this is less true when the education is obtained in concentrated areas.
Again, to make this claim, it is necessary that current cntyprop is a good
proxy for the cntyprop relevant when the individual was growing up.
Mexican Assimilation in the United States 117
Table 3.3 Education and income results
Log income regression
Education regression Fluency logit
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
cntyprop –4.48 –3.51 –1.41 –.37
(.99) (.16) (.02) (.02)










constant 14.19 –.58 9.614 8.712
(.02) (.02) (.004) (.008)
r-square .0967 .0305 .1078
Log likelihood –147,343
N 19,711 308,345 226,664 226,6643.2.6 Income and Concentration
Income is lower for individuals who live in highly concentrated areas,
given education, and years in the United States. As before, the direction of
causation is unclear. Those who have low incomes might choose to live in
concentrated areas because rents are lower. Alternatively, those who live in
concentrated areas never acquire the skills that are relevant to communi-
ties outside the concentrated ones in which they reside.
There is some suggestion of causation from cntyprop to income, how-
ever, which comes from comparing columns (3) and (4) of table 3.3. If the
causation went the other way, there would be little reason to expect that
holding education constant will kill oﬀ so much of the eﬀect, as it does
when it is included in the income regression. The most natural interpreta-
tion of the results is that those who live in concentrated areas obtain less
education, and this has very detrimental eﬀects on earnings. The rest of the
eﬀect in column (4) may reﬂect additional reductions in earnings that come
from living in a concentrated area, or it may simply reﬂect an income eﬀect.
The failure to identify causation in the results makes clear that it is very
diﬃcult to draw policy conclusions from the results. For example, it might
be tempting to suggest that individuals might be subsidized to move out of
concentrated areas.7 However, the choice of living in a concentrated area
may simply be one of allocating income optimally. Even if the causation
runs from concentration to income, there are costs of transition when in-
dividuals move to other areas, and those costs need to be taken into ac-
count. However, the estimates in table 3.3 can provide an upper bound to
the beneﬁts from moving from concentrated to less concentrated areas.
There may also be eﬀects on subsequent generations. Having parents who
live in concentrated areas implies that children grow up in concentrated ar-
eas. The spillover eﬀects across generations may be quite large, suggesting
additional gains to subsidizing moves outside of concentrated areas.8 (The
eﬀect must be a general equilibrium one, however. If one individual in a con-
centrated area is simply replaced by another similar immigrant as rent
prices adjust, nothing is gained.) Unfortunately, these eﬀects cannot be
identiﬁed in the data because we only know current residence and not resi-
dence during childhood for those who are already in the labor market.
3.3 Welfare
Can welfare explain some of the diﬀerence between Mexican and non-
Mexican assimilation? Theory suggests that it might. When an individual
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7. See Kling, Ludwig, and Katz (2004) on moving to opportunity.
8. See Lazear (1986) for analysis of the eﬀects of parental education and residential loca-
tion choice on income.can obtain government support, the value of assimilation is reduced. Wel-
fare places a ﬂoor on the amount that an individual can earn. In the ab-
sence of government transfers, the condition for acquiring the majority
culture, from equation (2), is
1   tj   pb.
A government transfer program can be thought of as guaranteeing some
average level of surplus, S. If
S   1   tj   pb,
then an individual who would have become assimilated in the absence of
the government transfer will remain monocultural and will merely accept
the transfer. Reducing the size of government transfers would increase the
rate of assimilation in the society.
Is this what is going on, and does it aﬀect Mexican immigrants diﬀer-
ently from non-Mexican immigrants? The evidence suggests that it is not
the explanation. Mexicans are somewhat more likely (13.1 percent versus
9.5 percent) to be on welfare than other immigrants and have almost the
same amount received given that they are on welfare. The welfare explana-
tion may have some force, but given the not enormous diﬀerences between
the groups, this is unlikely to be the source of assimilation diﬀerences. Ad-
ditionally, welfare is a negotiated beneﬁt in the sense that to obtain welfare,
one must apply and be approved by an agency. English speaking skills
might be important in the acquisition of the beneﬁts so the causal mecha-
nism is confounded. (See table 3.4.)
There is some evidence, consistent with Borjas (1999), that immigrants
from Mexico disproportionately go to states that have high welfare bene-
ﬁts. In table 3.5, column (1), a logit is run where the dependent variable is
a dummy for whether the person in question is Mexican. The independent
variables are the proportion of the native born population on welfare in the
state in which the immigrant resides and the average level of welfare among
the native born population in the state of immigrant’s residence.
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Table 3.4 Summary statistics of welfare use
Non-Mexican Mexican
Standard Standard 
Mean deviation Mean deviation
On welfare 9.5 .29 13.1 .34
Dollar amount received if on welfare 3,584 3,826 3,595 3,566
No. with positive welfare values 4,271 2,0423.3.1 Immigration Policy
Concentration of individuals in enclaves explains some of the diﬀerences
in the assimilation of Mexican and non-Mexican immigrants. But it is not
the entire story. Welfare may account for a small fraction of the residual
but cannot be the major issue. And even if welfare diﬀerences were pro-
nounced, it is still necessary to explain why Mexicans and non-Mexicans
diﬀer in their use of welfare.
The facts suggest that U.S. immigration policy is the culprit. Mexico is a
very large country, having over 100 million people. In 2003, the United
States admitted (legally) about 115,000 immigrants from Mexico. In a
country as large as Mexico, it is inconceivable that there are not a suﬃcient
number of talented potential migrants who would not assimilate more
slowly than other immigrants to the United States.
The United States admits more Mexicans than any other group, ac-
counting for 16 percent of immigrants in 2003. This ignores the illegal im-
migrants entirely, who are more likely to come from Mexico. Because so
many come from Mexico, it is not surprising that Mexican immigrants ﬁnd
it easier to locate in concentrated communities.
Also revealing is the eﬀect of admission policy. The United States admits
a far greater proportion of immigrants from Mexico on a family basis
(sponsored or immediate relatives) than from any other country. Put dif-
ferently, the proportion of Mexicans who are admitted on employment-
based preferences is much lower than that for other immigrants. About 3
percent of Mexicans come in on employment (skills) preference, whereas
13 percent of non-Mexican immigrants come in through this channel.
Some countries, like India, have a very high proportion of immigrants en-
tering the United States on job-based visas. (See table 3.6.)
These diﬀerences might explain some of the diﬀerences between Mexi-
cans and other groups, but probably not all. Among non-Mexicans, 13 per-
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Table 3.5 Welfare beneﬁts and location decisions of Mexicans
Logit dependent
(variable   Mexican)
Variable (1) (2)
Proportion of native born in state who  6.99
receive welfare (welfnatv) (1.26)
Average welfare received among native  .0059
born in state (welfnave) (.0002)
constant –1.03 –1.09
(.02) (.02)
Log likelihood –168,454 –115,228
N 281,995 180,477cent of immigrants are employment based, whereas only 3 percent of Mex-
icans are admitted on an employment basis. Suppose that everyone who
comes in on employment basis is ﬂuent in English. It is also true that 49
percent of the Mexican immigrants, almost all of whom come in on a non-
employment basis, are ﬂuent in English. Converting another 10 percent of
Mexican immigrants to employment based could at most raise the propor-
tion ﬂuent by .10   .51 or by about 5 percentage points, which would not
close the gap between Mexican and non-Mexican ﬂuency. To do that, other
indirect mechanisms, involving spouses and children, would have to be im-
portant. That such factors are important is reasonable and could be exam-
ined by looking at the correlation between one immigrant’s ﬂuency and
that of his family members.
The main point though seems plausible. Those who are admitted to the
United States because they have desirable skills are more likely to speak
English, have high levels of education, and obtain higher salaries than
those who are admitted on a random or family basis. The fact that those
who come in from Mexico do worse than those from other countries may
reﬂect to a signiﬁcant extent the admission policy of the United States
rather than anything about country of origin. In fact, in an earlier study
(Lazear 2000), it was found that the immigrants with the highest levels of
education and English ﬂuency came from North Africa. The reason is
clear: it was so diﬃcult to get into the United States from North Africa that
the only individuals who succeeded in obtaining admission were those with
very high skill sets.
3.4 Conclusion
Mexican immigrants assimilate more slowly than other immigrants as
reﬂected in English ﬂuency. They also have lower levels of education, lower
wages, and live in more concentrated areas than other immigrants.
The source of the problem seems to be U.S. immigration policy. By ad-
mitting large numbers of Mexicans, relative to other groups on a family
rather than job basis, the United States selects a group of immigrants from
Mexico who are already at a disadvantage. The large numbers allow highly
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Table 3.6 2003 immigrants to the United States, by class of admission and country of origin
Employment Percent 
Total based  Family  Immediate  employment 
Country immigrants preference sponsored relatives Other based
All 705,827 82,137 158,894 332,657 132,139 12
Mexico 115,864 3,261 29,664 78,782 4,157 3
Non-Mexico 589,963 78,876 129,230 253,875 127,982 13
India 50,372 20,560 15,359 12,693 1,760 41